Redstate...
Study
Reveals the Gulf of Mexico Permitting Mess
Posted by
Steve Maley
Thursday,
May 31
In a
rational world, the Federal government would act as a motivated lease
owner who
was interested in promoting the safe and environmentally responsible
development of his mineral resource, consistent with sound conservation
practice. That’s why there’s a permit process in the first place.
Since
Macondo, that’s backwards. Operating practices must conform to the
permitting
process that has, um, evolved in a purely political environment:
practical
considerations, economics and common sense be damned. And while the
politicians
proclaim a concern for production levels, product prices and jobs,
their
actions and policies tell another story.
A study
(pdf link) of Gulf of Mexico activity released on Wednesday by the Gulf
Economic Survival Team (GEST) indicates that much of the progress
claimed by
the Obama Administration is illusory. The Administration is putting a
lot of
time and effort into buffing the statistics to make it appear as though
things
are going swimmingly. (Just like in kids’ sports, ownership of the
official
scorebook can be a significant advantage. It never hurts to keep one
eye on the
scorekeeper.)
The study
was performed by Dr. Bernard L. Weinstein of SMU’s Cox School of
Business.
[It
details] the fallout from two years of difficulty implementing offshore
regulations that were revamped after the Macondo blowout. The
continuing
regulatory issues have led to decreased federal revenue, fewer active
rigs in
the Gulf, and lower forecasts of future production from the Gulf of
Mexico. …
According
to the report, companies attempting to plan and execute enormously
expensive,
multi-year offshore energy projects are not receiving the transparency
and
predictably required to conduct business. When the market lacks
confidence that
the government will remove obstacles to energy production in the Gulf
of Mexico
and elsewhere, traders incorporate this risk into current thinking and
future
price structures. Today’s offshore regulatory regime has bred a high
“U.S.
regulatory risk premium” that is dampening production and causing a
hidden
surcharge on the price of oil and gasoline in the market.
Dr.
Weinstein’s executive summary highlights the problems with permitting
and
transparency:
Federal
revenues from Gulf activity dwindle: Lease sales that brought billions
of
dollars in bonus consideration as recently as 2008 returned only $36
million in
2011′s only lease sale. With production off (see below), royalty income
is
down.
GOM rig
count increases are misleading: Notwithstanding “official” rig
statistics, the
number of rigs actually drilling wells has declined from 27 before
Macondo to
18 as of May 1.
Deemed
‘submitted’ period expanded: Now the staff goes over a new plan with a
fine
tooth comb to verify that it is 100% complete before it is “deemed
submitted” –
a new step in the process that makes it appear that permits are still
being
handled expeditiously. Since Macondo, the total time required for an
average
plan approval has ballooned from 50 to 207 days.
Permit
approval claims overblown: Many permits counted in the statistics were
to
restart operations suspended due to Macondo. Of 94 permits grant, only
32 were
for actual new wells targeting hydrocarbons.
Just-in-time
permitting breeds uncertainty: With 18 active deep-water rigs, the
inventory of
approved, “ready-to-go” permits should be at least 54. As of March 31,
there
were only 6 – leading companies to question where their rigs will be
going
next.
The study
further confirms what has previously been reported in these pages:
current
levels of oil production (in blue) from the Gulf are running 30% below
what was
expected in the last pre-Macondo production forecast (in red): (Click
link
below to see chart).
That
shortfall is nearly 10% of domestic production. According to Dr.
Weinstein, it
affects the consumer’s price at the gasoline pump. He concludes:
The outlook
for oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico remains murky.
Companies
making massive investments of capital and time require predictability
and
confidence that production goals can be met. If companies find it
increasingly
difficult to tell their own executives and board members when projects
are
going to be approved, this uncertainty will affect decisions about
where to
place future capital investment. Investors need reasonable
predictability or
they will simply look elsewhere for more inviting opportunities. If
Gulf
production is to reach levels that equal its true potential in the
months,
years, and decades to come, the regulatory sphere must deliver on its
obligation to provide a predictable review and approval process.
President
Obama is on target when calling for an “all-of-the-above” energy
strategy, both
to enhance domestic production—with all the attendant benefits of jobs
and
revenue—and to ensure America’s energy security. The Gulf of Mexico
contains
some of the world’s largest reservoirs of recoverable crude oil and
natural
gas. Bringing reasonable speed and transparency to the permitting
process for
deep water drilling is a critical component of a meaningful
all-of-the-above
domestic energy strategy. Absent such actions, American households and
businesses will continue to pay a hidden “surcharge” on oil and
gasoline that
reflects the current regulatory risk premium.
Cross-posted
at Maley’s Energy Blog.
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