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The Daily Signal
Hold the
Applause: No Iran Deal Yet
James Phillips
April 02, 2015
After missing its self-imposed negotiating deadline for the third time,
the Obama administration announced Thursday an agreement in principle
with an Iranian regime that has no principles, except to expand its
power and export its revolution.
“I am convinced if this framework leads to a final, comprehensive deal,
it will make our country, our allies, our world safer,” President Obama
said from the Rose Garden at the White House.
But attaining an acceptable final deal will be extremely difficult. The
thorniest issues remain unresolved, including the timing of sanctions
relief and how much research Tehran will be allowed to conduct on
uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuges.
Iran’s long history of violating its previous nuclear agreements
remains the elephant in the room. Obama stressed that the deal includes
“unprecedented verification.”
“If Iran cheats the world will know it,” he said. But how long will it
take to find out and will the world do anything about it after it has
discovered cheating?
Look at Syria, where the Obama administration trumpeted its 2013
agreement to destroy all of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons. Yet
today, that regime continues to use chlorine gas against its own
people, with little fear of the consequences.
The administration has sought to ease anxieties about verifying Iranian
compliance by stressing the role of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). But Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was able to block,
deflect and stall U.N. inspectors for years after signing a 1991
cease-fire agreement that included robust provisions for inspections.
Another potential problem is that it is not clear that Iran will be
required to come clean on the possible military dimensions of its
nuclear program before a final deal is signed.
This is vital, because otherwise the U.S. will not be able to establish
a baseline for the Iranian program that could serve as a reliable basis
for estimating how long it would take Iran to stage a nuclear
breakout—acquire enough weapons-grade fissile material to arm a nuclear
weapon.
Moreover, if Iran does not come clean on its past violations of its
nuclear commitments, how can it be trusted to comply with any new
commitments?
While the administration will spin the agreement as a signal that the
Iranians are acting more reasonably, Tehran will see the deal as
acceptance in the West of its policies and behavior. There is danger
that Iran will be emboldened to escalate its destabilizing behavior in
the region, not reduce it. And the more sanctions relief Iran gains,
the more cash it will have to finance terrorism and other subversive
activities.
No wonder Iranian officials are celebrating the announcement of the
deal as a major victory.
Read the details of the agreement over Iran’s nuclear program...
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be
removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All
centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA
monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060
IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1
models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced
centrifuges.
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at
Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce
enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited
research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a
schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will
be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10
years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan
submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional
Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities,
including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former
enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most
up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s
nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will
closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a
secret program.
Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous
surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25
years.
Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge
rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20
years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and
under continuous surveillance.
All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and
Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be
established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the
supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual
use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA,
providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s
nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate
suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility,
conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake
production facility anywhere in the country.
Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early
notification of construction of new facilities.
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s
concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its
program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor
in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will
not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful
nuclear research and radioisotope production.
The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the
production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will
be destroyed or removed from the country.
Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the
country for the reactor’s lifetime.
Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or
reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the
modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the
international market for 15 years.
Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its
commitments.
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the
IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related
steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these
sanctions will snap back into place.
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be
retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back
of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will
be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related
actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and
transparency).
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those
that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities –
will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that
will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also
create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a
key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms
and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for
related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated
by this new resolution.
A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA
participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of
JCPOA commitments.
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through
that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and
ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and
research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at
least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term
enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with
the P5+1.
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program.
For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy
water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and
accept enhanced transparency procedures.
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well
beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the
IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency
obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will
last for 25 years.
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s
nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or
acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its
nuclear program.
Read this and other articles at The Daily Signal
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