|
 |
Court News Ohio
Sex-Offender
Registration and Notification Mandates Are Constitutional
By Kathleen Maloney
November 12, 2015
State law requires convicted sex offenders to register and to verify
their addresses periodically with authorities. The Ohio Supreme Court
ruled today that those requirements for certain offenders do not amount
to cruel and unusual punishment.
The obligations for Tier II sex offenders “are not so extreme as to be
grossly disproportionate to the crime or shocking to a reasonable
person and to the community’s sense of justice,” Justice Judith Ann
Lanzinger wrote in the Court’s lead opinion, concluding that the
requirements violate neither the U.S Constitution nor the Ohio
Constitution.
The decision affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of
Appeals.
Young Man Must Report to Authorities for 25 Years
Travis Blankenship, 21, and a 15-year-old girl identified as M.H.
started talking online in 2011 through the social media site
PhoneZoo.com. During one conversation, they shared their ages. The two
met and became involved sexually. M.H. stated that their sexual
relationship was consensual.
Blankenship was charged with unlawful sexual conduct with a minor
between 13 and 16 years old. He pled guilty, and the trial court
sentenced him to five years of community control with conditions that
included six months in jail. The court released Blankenship after he
served 12 days.
In addition, he was categorized as a Tier II sex offender/child-victim
offender as mandated by state law. The designation required him to
register in person with the sheriffs in the counties where he lives,
works, and attends school. He also must verify his home address, place
of employment, and school location in person every 180 days for 25
years.
Blankenship appealed, and the Second District determined that the
sex-offender requirements of his sentence did not violate the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Ohio’s sex-offender registration and notification laws “do not meet the
high burden of being so extreme as to be grossly disproportionate to
the crime or shocking to a reasonable person.
- Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger
Ohio’s Notification Law
Under Ohio law, convicted sex offenders are classified into “tiers”
based on their offenses. Blankenship’s crime is a fourth-degree felony
and is categorized as “Tier II” because he was more than four years
older than M.H., and he had no prior convictions for sex offenses.
Justice Lanzinger noted that the law does not allow a trial judge to
modify these classifications.
Most states have dismissed claims that sex-offender registration
requirements are cruel and unusual punishment because the laws are not
considered punitive but instead are viewed as remedial. However,
Justice Lanzinger pointed out, the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v.
Williams (2011) that the registration and reporting mandates are
punitive measures.
Court Rejects Eighth Amendment Claim
In deciding whether the requirements violate the U.S. Constitution’s
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the
Court first explained that Blankenship acknowledged he could not argue
that a national consensus exists against registration laws for sex
offenders. Therefore, the Court moved on to consider Blankenship’s
level of responsibility, the severity of his punishment, and reasons
for these laws.
Justice Lanzinger noted that Blankenship had sex with M.H. twice while
knowing that she was a juvenile. He also violated a court order by
contacting her while his case was pending. The facts show he was
culpable for his actions, Justice Lanzinger concluded.
As far as his punishment, Blankenship could have been sentenced up to
18 months in prison, but instead he was placed on community control,
given a six-month sentence, and served 12 days.
And, Justice Lanzinger pointed out, M.H.’s consent does not mean
Blankenship’s punishment was too severe. “[W]e cannot say that the
state has no interest in protecting minors who may otherwise ‘consent’
to sexual activity,” she wrote. “Consent plays no role and is not a
viable defense in determining whether a person has violated R.C.
2907.04. A child under 16 is simply not legally capable of consent to
sexual conduct with an adult.”
She explained that the requirements for sex offenders are designed to
protect the community. While acknowledging that critics argue the laws
do not accomplish that purpose, supporters contend that the measures
are useful in monitoring and preventing repeat offenses. The Court
reasoned that the registration and notification requirements are not so
unjustified as to be a punishment that is cruel and unusual.
Requirements Also Do Not Violate Ohio Constitution
Under Ohio’s parallel provision protecting against cruel and unusual
punishment, the Court must decide whether a punishment “would be
considered shocking to any reasonable person” or “so greatly
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the
community,” Justice Lanzinger wrote, citing the Court’s case law.
“Blankenship has not overcome the hurdle of showing that his punishment
is cruel or unusual,” she determined. “The concerns that led us to
conclude that the requirement of lifetime registration for certain
juvenile offenders violated Ohio’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in In re C.P. [(2012)] are largely absent when
dealing with an adult who engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor.”
In addition, Justice Lanzinger noted, the General Assembly and all
other states have implemented some type of sex-offender registration
and notification requirements. As the national norm, “[the provisions]
cannot be said to be shocking to the sense of justice of the
community,” she reasoned.
“They do not meet the high burden of being so extreme as to be grossly
disproportionate to the crime or shocking to a reasonable person.”
Justices’ Votes
Joining the lead opinion were Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and
Justice Judith L. French. Justices Terrence O’Donnell and Sharon L.
Kennedy concurred only with the Court’s judgment in an opinion written
by Justice O’Donnell.
Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and William M. O’Neill both dissented in
separate opinions.
Concurring Opinion
Justice O’Donnell agreed that Blankenship’s registration and
notification requirements did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Contrary to the lead opinion, though, Justice O’Donnell
concluded that the provisions are not punishment for a crime.
Earlier Ohio Supreme Court opinions reviewing a prior sex-offender
registration statute determined the registration provisions were not
punishment, and that law was not significantly different from the
current sex-offender statute, Justice O’Donnell explained. In addition,
he pointed out, federal circuit courts have ruled that the federal
registration and notification mandates are not punitive, and that is
significant because the state legislature relied on those federal
statutes in enacting Ohio’s sex-offender registration and notification
laws. Justice O’Donnell urged the Court to overrule its decisions in
Williams and C.P., which declared the registration and notification
requirements to be punitive.
“Until the decisions in Williams and C.P., Ohio recognized registration
as a civil requirement, not punitive or criminal in nature,” Justice
O’Donnell wrote. “Instead of diametrically changing Ohio law, we should
follow our precedent and established federal law and hold that
classifying Blankenship as a Tier II sex offender does not punish him
for an offense and therefore cannot violate the United States
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”
“Sex offender registration is not punishment, and therefore we need not
decide whether classifying Blankenship as a Tier II sex offender with a
duty to report every 180 days for 25 years is proportionate to his
offense of having consensual sex with a minor,” he concluded. He
further clarified that “[q]uestions regarding whether this registration
duty is necessary and appropriate in these circumstances do not involve
the Eighth Amendment, but rather, these are matters of policy that are
the province of the General Assembly, the arbiter of public policy in
Ohio.”
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Pfeifer, on the other hand, sees Blankenship’s circumstances as
relevant for constitutional reasons but not for the statutory analysis.
Blankenship’s punishment must be proportional to his crime to survive
an Eighth Amendment challenge, Justice Pfeifer explained. He noted that
under the current law an offender released from prison after 12 days
has the same reporting requirements as one who serves an 18-month
sentence, and those unlikely to reoffend are subject to the same
reporting mandates as those more likely to repeat the crimes.
Proportionality is lacking in this approach and is cruel and unusual as
applied to Blankenship, Justice Pfeifer reasoned.
The justice also would have ruled that the registration and reporting
law violates Blankenship’s constitutional rights under Ohio’s standard.
“Today we should declare that in certain circumstances, the 25-year
reporting requirements are onerous enough to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment,” Justice Pfeifer wrote. “I do not believe that the
registration and address-verification requirements at issue in this
case are cruel and unusual with respect to all Tier II sex offenders.
But as applied to Blankenship, who was deemed to warrant a prison
sentence of only 12 days, who has a low risk of reoffending, and who
possesses none of the characteristics of a sex offender, the
requirement to register and verify his address every six months for the
next 25 years ‘would be considered shocking to any reasonable person.’”
He would have reversed the appellate court’s judgment.
Additional Dissent
In his dissent, Justice O’Neill also concluded that Blankenship’s
registration and notification requirements are consistent with the
statute, but are barred constitutionally because they constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Justice O’Neill protested the lack of judicial
discretion in cases and the “one-size-fits-all mentality that
increasingly dictates criminal sentencing in Ohio.”
“When sex offenders present a real threat to the public, the law indeed
deters further crime, punishes the offender, and provides information
the public can use to protect itself from offenders of the worst sort,”
he wrote. “However, this is not one of those cases. And yet this trial
court was required to impose the penalty as prescribed.”
He added that the reporting mandates will limit Blankenship’s job
prospects and label him as a “pariah” for the long period of 25 years
even though a psychologist found Blankenship suffered from no mental
disorders and was unlikely to reoffend. Justice O’Neill concluded that
Blankenship’s punishment was “grossly disproportionate” to his crime.
|
|
|
|
